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A. Exceptions and Brief
In Odom v. County of Florence' the South Carolina Supreme
Court took a drastic but necessary step to uphold the integrity of
the Rules of the Supreme Court. Rule 4, section 62 states the
requirements for the formal exceptions to be included in the
transcript of record on appeal. Basically, the requirement is for a
single, complete, brief assignment of error in each exception, with
the object being that "every ground of appeal ought to be so
distinctly stated that the court may at once see the point which
it is called upon to decide without having to 'grope in the dark'
to ascertain the precise point at issue."3
In a brief per curiam opinion in Odom, the court noted that
none of appellant's exceptions contained any assignment of error
whatever, being instead in the form of questions. Although the
court does not say so, the seven "Exceptions" listed in the trans-
cript of record are actually verbatim copies of the seven "Ques-
tions Involved" in appellant's brief. Since the statement of ques-
tions involved is also required by the rules,4 a practice such as this
would obviously deprive the court of information which the rules
intended to make mandatory. Because nothing was properly be-
fore the court for review, the appeal was dismissed.
A similar situation and result occurred in Lawson v. Ark-
wright Mills.- Here the court disapproved not only of appellant's
exceptions but also of his brief. Citing a lack of full compliance
with rule 8, section 21 and total disregard of rule 8, section 3,7 the
1. 258 S.C. 480, 189 S.E.2d 293 (1972).
2. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4, § 6. In relevant part this rule reads as follows: "Each exception
must contain a concise statement of one proposition of law or fact which this Court is
asked to review. . . .Each exception must contain within itself a complete assignment
of error . ..."
3. Brady v. Brady, 222 S.C. 242, 245, 72 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1952).
4. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 8, § 2.
5. 259 S.C. 308, 191 S.E.2d 637 (1972).
6. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 8, § 2. In relevant part this rule reads as follows: "The statement
of the questions involved must be set out in the briefest and most general terms. It should
never exceed one page, unless the questions involved absolutely require it and must always
be printed on the first page of the Brief, without any other matter appearing thereon."
7. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 8, § 3. This rule reads as follows:
The Brief of argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions
to be argued; shall have at the head of each part in distinctive type, or in type
1
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court dismissed the appeal. There was some attempt to soften the
impact of this holding on the parties involved by a dictum that
no prejudicial error was apparent from the record and briefs.
B. Motion for a New Trial
Bowers v. Watkins Carolina Express, Inc.,' dealt primarily
with the propriety of statements made in closing argument to the
jury by counsel for plaintiff, an interesting point discussed in the
Survey of Practice and Procedure. Having decided that the argu-
ment was improper and that the handling thereof by the trial
court was in error, the supreme court was faced with plaintiff-
respondent's contention that relief should be denied because the
impropriety was not made the ground of a motion for mistrial or
for a new trial.
The supreme court rejected this contention, choosing to
place primary emphasis on its common sense reason for doing so:
"When the court, in effect, overruled defendant's objection to the
argument, it would have been futile to move for a mistrial based
upon the same objection."' A 1939 case, Hubbard v. Rowe, 10 was
cited in support of this holding. There, in a more complete discus-
sion, it is made clear that the only requirement is that the ques-
tion must have been properly raised in the trial court and ruled
upon there. While this may in some circumstances mean that a
motion for new trial would be necessary, that is only one manifes-
tation of the general rule.
C. Presentation of Issue in Lower Court
Although avoided by appellant in the Bowers case above, the
most common pitfall on appeal remains the requirement noted
from Hubbard v. Rowe"l that the question presented on appeal
must have been properly raised in the trial court. The principle
must be deceptive in its simplicity, for the supreme court dis-
poses of questions because of noncompliance with that rule with
distinctively displayed, the particular point treated therein, followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as is deemed pertinent; and under each
head shall refer to the specific exception alleged to raise the question being
considered therein.
8. 259 S.C. 371, 192 S.E.2d 190 (1972).
9. Id, at 376, 192 S.E.2d at 192.
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amazing regularity. Some of the factual situations in which it has
arisen during the survey period are outlined here.
Hester v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co."2 involved an
action against an insurer to recover the amount of a default judg-
ment against the insured. The defense of the defendant-insurer
was that it received neither notice of the original suit nor the suit
papers therein as required by the terms of its policy. The Spar-
tanburg Civil Court agreed with plaintiff that the insurer waived
its right to rely on these policy conditions, but the county court
reversed because of a total absence of evidence to support this
finding.
On appeal, the supreme court agreed with the county court
that there was no evidence of waiver. It then faced plaintiff-
appellant's contention that the verdict in her favor should be
sustained because the insurer failed to show it had been preju-
diced by the failure of the insured to forward suit papers. This
assertion, if true, would undoubtedly have supported a verdict for
plaintiff based on established South Carolina law.'3 But the court
refused to consider it because "it was not presented nor consid-
ered by the trial court, nor [was] it raised by any exception on
appeal to this Court."' 14 Verdict for the insurer was affirmed.
Carolina Home Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong Furnace Co.15
was an interesting tort case in which plaintiff initially recovered
for damages to its apartment complex allegedly caused by heat-
ing and cooling equipment manufactured by defendant. Although
reversing and remanding because of an improper instruction to
the jury, the supreme court elected to treat all of defendant's
questions in the course of its opinion.
One such question concerned another instruction to the jury
that "an implied warranty arises if the manufacturer who sells
the product knows 'the particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on its skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods . . ,,.'" Defendant-appellant
considered that instruction to be improper because there was no
evidence of the existence of such knowledge. But, since it had not
taken advantage of its opportunity to object to the charge at
12. 259 S.C. 45, 190 S.E.2d 487 (1972). See also Survey of Insurance infra.
13. See Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of America v. Kennedy, 256 S.C. 376, 182 S.E.2d
727 (1971); Squires v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 58, 145 S.E.2d 673 (1965).
14. Hester v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 259 S.C. 45, 50, 190 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1972).
15. 259 S.C. 346, 191 S.E.2d 774 (1972).
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trial," defendant was not allowed to raise the issue on appeal.
The primary issue on appeal in Bledsoe v. Metts5 concerned
the granting by the trial judge of defendant's motion to be re-
lieved of a failure to plead within the time required by law. After
deciding this question against plaintiff-appellant, the supreme
court considered her contention that the trial court abused its
discretion because the certificate of defendant's attorney did not
comply with Circuit Court Rule 19.11
Here the court appeared to retreat from its usual position for
no particular reason. After stating that the issue "is not properly
before us for decision for the reason that the record does not
disclose that it was made or decided in the court below,"2 the
court went on to decide the issue anyway by saying that the
certificate did substantially comply with rule 19.
The careful language quoted above may indicate that the
court believed the issue was actually raised in the trial court, with
the record on appeal failing to indicate that fact. But whatever
the reason, it does not seem to justify the weakening of the court's
position. A better solution (and perhaps the one intended by the
court) would have been to apply the customary principle abso-
lutely, and then to indicate gratuitously that there was "proba-
bly" no merit to the claim anyway.21 Any hint that the court may
be willing to consider issues not raised in the trial court can only
encourage attorneys to argue them on a theory of "what do I have
to lose?". This will lead to more wasted time on the part of all
concerned.
D. The Record
With the importance attached to the contents of the record
on appeal, as shown by the Bledsoe case discussed above, it is
inevitable that questions will occasionally arise on appeal con-
17. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1210 (1962).
18. 258 S.C. 500, 189 S.E.2d 291 (1972).
19. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 19. In relevant part this rule reads as follows:
No order extending the time to answer or demur to a complaint shall be granted
unless the party applying for such order shall present to the Judge to whom the
application shall be made a certificate of the attorney or counsel retained to
defend the action, that, from the statement made to him by the defendant, he
verily believes that the defendant has a good and substantial defense upon the
merits to the cause of action set forth in the complaint or to some part thereof.
20. Bledsoe v. Metts, 258 S.C. 500, 504, 189 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1972).
21. See Lawson v. Arkwright Mills, 259 S.C. 308, 191 S.E.2d 637 (1972), discussed
earlier in this article.
[Vol. 25
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cerning the contents of the record. Rule 4, section 7, of the Rules
of the Supreme Court 22 is the controlling authority to be followed
procedurally in such instances. It confers on the trial judge the
authority to settle the record for appeal when the parties cannot
agree. But any party aggrieved by the settlement order may ap-
peal from it, inserting in an appendix to the settled case the
matters necessary for a consideration of the appeal.
The case of Seymour v. Seymour 23 raised a threshold ques-
tion concerning appeal from an order settling the record. Appel-
lant noted exceptions 24 to the order settling the case in an appen-
dix to the transcript of record; he also reserved a place for the
transcript of the settlement hearing before the trial judge .25 When
appellant's counsel discovered that the hearing had not been re-
corded and transcribed, they commented thereon in their brief2
but took no further steps to place before the supreme court a
formal statement of their objections to the settlement order. The
court had before it in the transcript of record the appellant's
proposed case, 27 the respondent's proposed case, 2 and the state-
ment as settled by the trial court.29 Nonetheless, it held as fol-
lows: "The additional matters which appellant sought to have
included in the record have not been printed and their nature is
not disclosed. Appellant has therefore failed to carry the burden
of showing error as alleged. These exceptions are overruled."'"
This ruling kept the supreme court out of the realm of speculation
as to exactly what objections appellant had made at the settle-
ment hearing. It offers no hint of leniency for parties who may
wish to challenge an order of settlement.
In another case, Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Elmwood
Properties,3 1 both parties appealed from the order of settlement.
Although ostensibly reaching the merits on this appeal, the
court's only comment was that it thought "the record as settled
by the trial judge was adequate. ... . Again, little encourage-
ment was offered to those who would question such an order.
22. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4, § 7.
23. 259 S.C. 26, 190 S.E.2d 502 (1972).
24. Record at 55.
25. Id. at 54.
26. Brief for Appellant at 16-17.
27. Record at 49.
28. Id. at 52.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. Seymour v. Seymour, 259 S.C. 26, 29, 190 S.E.2d 502, 503 (1972).
31. 258 S.C. 221, 187 S.E.2d 799 (1972).
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11. REviEw
A. Findings of Lower Court
A seemingly well-settled area of the law in South Carolina
involves the scope of review which the supreme court will exercise
over findings of fact by the lower court. This scope varies of course
with the nature of the action and with the history of the case
before the trial judge and master. During the survey period the
court had occasion to restate its position in three different situa-
tions, making them available for contrast here.
Hutchinson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.13 was an ac-
tion at law, tried by consent of the parties before the presiding
judge without a jury. Defendant challenged a finding by the trial
court that plaintiff had returned to a condition of only partial
disability between an earlier accident and the accident at issue
in this case. Before answering the question, the supreme court
stated its scope of review in such a case as follows:
It is well settled that when, as here, an action at law is by
agreement of the parties tried by the judge, without a jury, his
findings of fact have the force and effect of a jury verdict upon
the issues and are conclusive upon appeal unless unsupported
by any competent evidence, or shown to have been influenced
by an error of law."
Lowndes Products, Inc. v. Brower5 was a complex and diffi-
cult case in which plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages
for misappropriation of trade secrets and for a breach of duty of
loyalty on the part of its employees. The circuit judge affirmed
the master's recommendations that all issues be resolved against
plaintiff. Before entering its lengthy discussion of the evidence
and issues on plaintiffs appeal, the court reiterated the control-
ling principle for such a setting:
It is appropriate to here restate this general proposition:
Concurrent findings of fact by the master and trial judge will not
be disturbed on appeal unless against the clear preponderance
of the evidence or without evidentiary support."
33. 259 S.C. 219, 191 S.E.2d 157 (1972).
34. Id. at 222, 191 S.E.2d at 159.
35. 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
36. Id. at 328, 191 S.E.2d at 765 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 25
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Talbot v. James37 was another complex equitable action, this
one brought by stockholders against a corporate director-officer
for an accounting. The master in equity recommended judgment
for plaintiffs (actually for the corporation) in the amount of
$25,025.31, but the circuit judge reversed the master's findings
and ordered judgment for defendants. On appeal the supreme
court stated its role as follows:
This being an equity case and the Master and the Circuit Judge
having disagreed and made contrary findings on the material
issues in the case, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the
evidence and make findings in accordance with our view of the
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence."
Although very similar to the test applied in Lowndes
Products, this test is slightly different. If the master and circuit
judge have agreed on findings, the supreme court will upset them
only if against the clear preponderance of the evidence. But if the
master and circuit judge have disagreed, the supreme court may
determine the facts in accordance with its own view of the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, free from any type of presumption.
This distinction was probably determinative in Talbot, where
three members of the court reversed the circuit court and agreed
with the master's findings while two dissenting justices agreed
with the circuit judge's findings. Because the issue was close
enough to cause a 3-2 split, it seems unlikely that the court would
have disturbed the decision of the circuit judge had the test re-
quired the findings to be against the clear preponderance of the
evidence.
B. Amount of Recovery
Another familiar comment on the scope of review was re-
stated in the case of Smoak v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
Co. 39: "This Court will reverse the refusal of a motion for a new
trial on the contention that a verdict is excessive only when the
verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the
Court."4 While the test has been variously stated as whether the
verdict shocked the conscience of the court,4' whether the trial
37. 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759 (1972).
38. Id. at 77-78, 190 S.E.2d at 761.
39. 193 S.E.2d 594 (S.C. 1972). See also Survey of Damages infra.
40. 193 S.E.2d at 597.
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judge abused his discretion, 2 and whether the verdict was wholly
unsupported by the evidence,43 the test is a familiar one in South
Carolina law.
This case presented an added dimension to the test, however.
The supreme court in effect took judicial notice of inflation and
the rising cost of living, implying that the amounts of verdicts
have necessarily increased just as the wages of carpenters and the
cost of a can of beans.44 Because of this, the court emphasized
that a comparison with past verdicts for similar injuries may be
informative but cannot be controlling.
After setting this background, the court referred to a verdict
5
in 1955 awarding $50,000 actual damages and $15,000 punitive
damages for the wrongful death of a twelve year old boy. In
Smoak the decedent was an employed eighteen year old boy con-
tributing to the support of his mother and father; the damages
for wrongful death were $75,000 actual and $25,000 punitive. Con-
sidering this implied comparison and the recognized change in
the value of money, the court decided that the award in Smoak
could not be deemed unreasonable.
The explicit recognition of inflation was not at all unique,46
but such language in the past has accompanied an apparent feel-
ing by the court that the verdict approached the allowable lim-
its. " Taking this together with the full and fairly lengthy discus-
sion of the amount of the verdict in Smoak, one might be tempted
to infer that a verdict significantly larger than the one rendered
would have been labeled excessive in the factual situation of this
case.
C. Motion Not Passed Upon by Lower Court
Pamplico Bank and Trust Co. v. Prosser" came to the su-
42. Neese v. Toms, 196 S.C. 67, 77-78, 12 S.E.2d 859, 864 (1941).
43. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority v. Spearwant Liquidating Co., 196 S.E. 481,
484-85, 13 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1941).
44. "Money represents buying power. A verdict which was excessive when a carpenter
earned forty cents an hour, might not be excessive today, when a carpenter earns three or
four dollars an hour. A verdict given when beans were seventeen cents a can, would not
represent the same consideration as when beans are thirty-seven cents a can." 193 S.E.2d
at 597.
45. Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 830 (1955).
46. See, e.g., Cabler v. L.V. Hart, Inc., 251 S.C. 576, 581, 164 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1968).
47. "While the amount of the judgment is large and has given some concern ... "
Cabler v. L.V. Hart, Inc., 251 S.C. 576, 580, 164 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1968).
48. 193 S.E.2d 539 (S.C. 1972).
[Vol. 25
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preme court on appeal from an order granting summary judgment
to plaintiff in an action for indebtedness due on a promissory
note. The lower court had granted the summary judgment based
on the second of two grounds set forth in the motion, involving a
question of election of remedies. This holding was reversed by the
supreme court for reasons not of interest here.
The court then noted that both parties on appeal had argued
at length the other ground in the original motion for summary
judgment: that the matters set forth in the answer did not consti-
tute a defense to the complaint. Without any reference to rule 4
(sections 7 and 8) of the Rules of the Supreme Court49 or to any
other explanation, the court in its discretion refrained from any
discussion of the questions involved therein since the lower court
had not passed upon them. It did, however, "call attention" to a
lengthy quotation setting forth and emphasizing the heavy bur-
dens that must be borne by one seeking summary judgment.
While of no value as precedent, this admonition undoubtedly
served to convey a message to the parties involved in further
proceedings in this particular case.
D. Discretion of Lower Court
Defendant-appellant's counsel in the automobile collision
case of Able v. Young" sought to circumvent an order by the trial
judge granting plaintiff a new trial based on his consideration of
the evidence. The supreme court restated the settled rule in
South Carolina that such an order is completely within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge and is not appealable, not even to deter-
mine whether there was an abuse of discretion. In an attempt to
subvert the rule, appellant argued that it should not apply when
it appears from the face of the order that the order was based on
an incomplete summary of the testimony and on irrelevant facts.
Although admitting that part of the order was ineptly drawn, the
court rejected the argument that this should render it appealable.
49. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4, § 7, reads in relevant part: "When the appellant shall serve
a proposed case. . . . the respondent shall, within ten days thereafter, serve upon appel-
lant any proposed amendment thereto, including any additional grounds upon which this
Court will be asked to sustain the rulings or judgment below; and on failure to do so, he
shall be deemed to have agreed to the proposed case."
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4, § 8, reads: "While respondent may be restricted in argument to
such additional sustaining grounds as noticed by him, this Court reserves the right to
sustain any ruling, order or judgment upon any grounds appearing in the record."
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In Bledsoe v. Metts5' the plaintiff-appellant challenged an
order by the trial judge allowing defendant to file his answer after
the 20-day period required by section 10-641 of the Code12 had
expired. The supreme court stated that such a motion is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In view of the
liberal construction which such motions should receive in further-
ance of justice, 3 appellant failed to show any abuse of discretion
that would justify disturbing the order on appeal.
J.H. TEDARDS, JR.
51. 258 S.C. 500, 189 S.E.2d 291 (1972).
52. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-641 (1962) reads: "The only pleading on the part of the
defendant is either a demurrer or an answer. It must be served within twenty days after
the service of the copy of the complaint."
53. See McGhee v. One Chevrolet Sedan, 235 S.C. 37, 109 S.E.2d 713 (1959).
10
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